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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
NATIONAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

EAST LAWN MEMORIAL HILLS, INC.,
a corporation; WESTERN S TATE S
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRUSTEE, UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, and W. SMOOT BRIMHALL,
COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH,

Defendants.
Case No.
12179

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment made and
entered on the 12th day of June, 1970, by the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, one of the I udges of the
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, determining there was insufficient evidence presented
by defendant to support a novation and that plaintiff, National American Life, have judgment authorizing the foreclosure of its Trust Deed as a Real
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Estate Mortgage, and further authorizing the sale
of defendants property to satisfy its judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter came before the lower court for pretrial on the 22nd day of May, 1970. (R. 125). At the
pre-trial conference, plaintiff renewed its previous
motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 140). Defendant
also moved for Summary Judgment (R. 140) and fur1.her moved for leave to amend the pleadings to assert a counterclaim. (R. 141). Counsel for plaintiff
objected and the trial court sustained the objection.
(R. 141). Both Summary Judgment motions were
taken under advisement. (R. 140). The trial court
entered its memorandum decision (R. 142) and
found tl,.,a.t there was insufficient evidence to support a novation and granted plaintiff's motion for
Summary Judgment.
Findings of Fa_ct, Conclusions of Law, Decree of
Foreclosure and Order granting plaintiff's motion
for Sumrflary Judgment were entered accordingly.
(R. 143, 147).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's Order granting plaintiff
Judgment and further that this Court vacate the Decree of Foreclosure entered pursuant thereto.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 21, 1965, plaintiff, National American Life Insurance Company and defendant, East
Lawn Memorial Hills, Inc. entered into an agreement evidenced by a note in the face amount of
Sixty-Three Thousand Six Hundred ($63,600) Doll2rs. (R. 8). To secure said note, the parties entered
into a "Deed of Trust: (R. 9 through 12). Guaranty
Fund Certificate No. 128 in the face amount of One
Hundred Thousand ($100,000) Dollars (R. 86) was
pledged as security for the payment of the note
0nd Deed of Trust. (R. 96).
On May 4, 1965, the parties mutually agreed
upon Shirley Patterson White assuming and covenanting to pay the note and Deed of Trust (mortgage) sought to be foreclosed herein. (R. 87). As
security for the pa_yment by Shirley Patterson White,
fifty (50%) percent of the stock of First Security Savmgs and Loan Ass o c i at ion was pledged
to insure payment of the note and Deed of Trust
(mortgage). (R. 87, 88 and 89).
This substitution of security was the result of
an agreement in which Shirley Patterson White, at
the instance and request of plaintiff, National Americcn Life Insurance Company, was to purchase the
stock of First Security Savings and Loan Association, a Mississippi Corporation.
The payment for the First Security stock was to
be made by Shirley Patterson White assuming and
paying the note and Deed of Trust. The agreement
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was entered into in lieu of and in substitution of
the pledge of the Guaranty Fund Certificate No. 128
when the proceeds of said Guaranty Fund Certificate were not forthcoming as originally agreed
upon. At the time of the substitution of said security
the Guaranty Fund Certitficate No. 128 was released
completely as security for the payment of the note
and mortgage. On February 27, 1967, the plaintiff
and Shirley Patterson White Stockett entered into
a second pledge and Hypothecation Agreement.
(R. 90-92). This pledge and Hypothecation Agreement wc..s made without the knowledge or consent
of East Lawn Memorial Hills, Inc. Defendant, East
Lawn Memorial Hills, Inc., in its answer to plaintiff's
complaint, asserted that the substituted security
pledged on February 27, 1967 did not have the value
to secure the payment of the note and mortgage as
did the stock pledged under the previous Hypothecation Agreement of May 4, 1965. (R. 76).
Shirley Patterson White made payments on the
mortgage from May, 1965 until March 15, 1967.
(Deposition of Harold Webb, Exhibit VII.) Defendant,
East Lawn Memorial Hills, was not notified of the
default of Shirley Patterson White until February
18, 1969. (Deposition of Harold Webb, Ex. XII.) This
was nearly 2 years after the date of last payment by
Mrs. White. Yet White was allowed by plaintiff to
substitute the initial security pledged with plaint££.
(R. 90-92). On Aprl 11, 1969, plaintiff, National American, filed a complaint seeking to foreclose upon the
real property owned by defendant, East Lawn
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Memorial Hills, Inc. (R. 3). Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. (R. 22). Defendant later
filed an amended answer and asserted as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff was estopped
from foreclosing. Defendant claimed that plaintiff
had sufficient security for the indebtedness in the
form of the Fifty (50%) percent stock in First Security Savings and Loan Association; that the later substitution was done without defendant's knowledge,
consent or approval all to defendants damage. And
asked that plaintiff be required to account to defendant and that the court award and assess the
damages to defendants as a result of plaintiff's
wrongful release of the security pledged for the
payment of the note. (R. 76).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
RULING THAT THERE WAS NO NOVATION.

A novation arises when a creditor accepts the
obligations of a third person as a substitute in the
place of the original debtor. Andrews v. St. Louis Joint
Stock Land Bank, 127 F.2d 799 (C.A. 8th 1942) Associates
Discount Corp v. Greisinger, 103 F. Supp 705 (D.C. Pa.
1952).
The essential legal elements to establish a novation are:
1.

Parties capable of contracting;
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2.

A valid prior obligation to be displaced;

3. The consent of all the parties to the substitution; and
4. Lastly, the extinction of the old obligation
and the creation of a valid new one. Vol. 2, Williston,
Contracts 3rd Ed. Section 353 P. 816.
There is no factual dispute concerning the contractual capacity of the parties in the instant case.
Nor is there any factual dispute concerning the legal
validity of the prior obligation to be discharged,
(herein the note secured by a deed of trust).
What is in dispute is:
1. Whether there was consent of all of the
parties to the substitution of Shirley Patterson White
for East Lawn, and If so,
2. Did the parties intend that the East Lawn
obligation to be extinguished by the substitution.
These latter two requirements necessarily depend upon the intentions of the parties. City N atio11al
Bank v. Fuller, 52 F 2d 870 (C.A. 8th 1931); Engineering
Service Corp. v. Langridge Investment Co., 153 Cal App.
2d 404, 314 P2d 563 (1957). Which intentions are determined from the facts and circumstances involved.
Buerger Bros. Supply Co. v. El Rey Furniture Co., 43 Ariz.
472, 32 P2d 1029 (1934). And which intentions need
not be expressed or evidenced in any particular
manner but can be implied or inferred from the at-
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tendant factual circumstances. Alexander v. Angel, 37
Cal. 2d 856, 236 P2d 561 (1951).
The parties in the instant case mutually agreed
that Shirley Patterson White would assume and
covenant to pay the note secured by the deed of
trust. These intentions became manifest when she
signed the assumption agreement dated May 4,
1965. The agreement was prepared by National
American Life. It was notarized by its officer. As
part of the transaction, and to further insure that
Shirley Patterson White would pay the obligation,
the fifty (50%) percent of the capital stock
of First Security Savings and Loan Association
that she had agreed to purchase from defendants
herein was to be held by plaintiff until she paid off
the note secured by the deed of trust. Pursuant to
this arrangement, plaintiff held the stock. Shirley
Patterson White commenced payments on the note
in May, 1965. The payment was accepted by plaintiff in May, 1965. She continued to make regular
payments to plaintiff for each month thereafter for
approximately 22 consecutive months. Plaintiff accepted each and every payment made during this
entire period of time. Plaintiff held its security in
the form of First Security Savings and Loan for approximately 21 months. Plaintiff's participation in
this subsequent agreement is obvious from the record. During this entire period of time, plaintiff looked
solely to Shirley Patterson White for payment. No
statements of account were sent to defendant, East
Lawn. No notice of delinquency was sent to de-
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fendant. In fact, the record indicates that Shirley
Patterson White was in default nearly 2 years after
the March 15, 1967 monthly payment was made before defendants were so notified. Plaintiff, in its acceptance of Shirley Patterson White as a substitute
obligor, allowed her to substitute the security held
by them to insure her payment. No notification of
this substitution was sent to defendant. All of the
above factors clearly indicate that the intention of
the parties was to substitute Shirley Patterson White
as the obligor on the East Lawn note. If plaintiff
were still looking to defendant, why were no statements sent? If plaintiff were looking to defendant
for payment, why didn't they notify defendant of
Shirley Patterson White's defalcations? If plaintiff
were looking to defendant, why did plaintiff fail
to notify defendant of the agreement to substitute
the security held by plaintiff to insure payment by
Shirley Patterson White? If plaintiff were looking
to defendant for payment, why did plaintiff allow
nearly 2 years of defaults to occur by White before
notifying defendant of her nonpayment?
These facts would clearly indicate that the intentions of the parties were that Shirley Patterson
White would be substituted for East Lawn and that
National American would henceforth look to and
deal with White for payment. National American
did in fact look to White. They should now be
estopped from changing their position after nearly
4 years of dealing with White. Particularly where
East Lawn, in reliance thereon, has materially
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altered its position. Viewing these facts in a light
most favorable to the party moved against, as the
Court is required to do, the trial Court's ruling that
there was no novation as a matter of law, was erroneous and contrary to the evidence presented in
behalf of defendant, the inferences to be drawn
therefrom and contrary to the legal precedents and
authorities above cited.
POINT 2.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES WAS ONE OF SURETY AND
THAT THE ACTS OF NATIONAL AMERICAN EFFECTED A RELEASE OF THE EAST LAWN.

Section 83 (c), Restatement Law of Security indicates that a suretyship relationship is established
where the surety:
(c) "having been a principal obligor, his obligation, without a novation, has been assumed or his
property has been transferred under such circumstances as to place the property under the primary
burden of the obligation."
Paragraph third of the assumption agreement
(R. 87) prepared by National American Life Insurance Company, reads as follows:
"For valuable consideraticn, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, and full discharge and acquitance granted therefore,
appearer (Shirley Patterson White) does hereby assume to the full relea&e, discharge and
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acquitance of East Lawn Memorial Hills, Inc.,
all of the payments in and under a certain deed
of trust made and executed in the County of
Utah, State of Utah, on the 26th day of January, 1965, which deed of trust was duly filed
of record as Act No. 1251, Book 998, pages
632-635 on January 26, 1965; appearer
acknowledges that there is a balance due in
the principal and interest as of May 15, 1965,
the sum of sixty-three thousand three hundred
seven and 19/100 ($63,307.19), which said sum
appeared as specifically and unconditionally
bind and obligate herself to pay to National
American Life Insurance Company of Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, all in accordance with the
amortization schedule and other stipulations
and provisions contained in said deed of trust."

As part of the consideration for the assumption by
White, the agreement further provided that ten
thousand (10,000) shares of the capital stock of First
Security Savings and Loan Association be pledged
to the plaintiff, National American Life Insurance
Company, and further in paragraph 3 of said document, National American Life was granted "The
full right to vote the shares of stock represented by
Stock Certificate Number Ten above referred to."
These ten thousand (10,000) shares represented control of First Security Savings and Loan. To maintain
the control of the corporation and thus the value of
the security, paragraph 4 of the document drafted
by National American Life, further provided that no
additional stock would be issued in First Security
Savings and Loan Association without Shirley Patterson White pledging fifty (50%) percent of any
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additional stock so issued. And finally, paragraph
two of the document grants National American Life
Insurance Company the power to sell the First
Security Savings and Loan Association stock in the
event of a defualt by Shirley Patterson White.
National American Life Insurance Company accepted the document referred to above together
with the terms thereof as above outlined. It accepted
payments from Shirley Patterson White and pursuant thereto accepted the First Security Savings
and Loan stock together with additional powers and
authorities and did in fact exercise the powers and
authority granted under said pledge and
cation agreement. In the case of Kennedy v. Griffith,
95 P2d 752 (1939) the Utah Supreme Court made the
following signifcant observations:
"Here was a case where a third party
agreed to pay the obligations of one party to
another. The resulting relationship was akin
to suretyship which appellants as the principal
debtor and the respondents as sort of surety
because not released by Johnson. (Emphasis
supplied) In fact, it was a simple agreement to
pay the debt of another, which, when breached,
gave use to a right of action against the other.
So far as the relationship between the original
debtor and the one who assumed the debt is
concerned, the original debtor became surety and
the one who assumed, the principal." (emphasis
supplied)

In the instant case, Shirley Patterson White agreed
to pay the obligation of East Lawn to National Amer-
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ican. In fact, she paid the obligation for approximately 2 years. Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, and the position of the Utah court
in the Kennedy case" supra, the relationship thus
established between the original debtor, East Lawn,
and the assuming debtor, Shirley Patterson White,
was one of surety. East Lawn became surety for
the payment of the obligation of National American
which was assumed by White who became the primary obligor. The trial court erred as a matter of
law in not concluding that East Lawn, under the
terms of the pledge and Hypothecate Agreement,
became a surety for the payment of the obligation
assumed by White who was accepted by National
American as the primary obligor.

B.

THE ACTS OF NATIONAL AMERICAN EFFECTED A RELEASE OF EAST LAWN.

On February 27th, 1967, a second pledge and
Hypothecation Agreement was prepared by plaintiff, National American, by and through Rufus D.
Hayes, an officer of the plaintiff corporation. Under
the terms of said agreement Shirley Patterson White
Stockett formerly Shirley Patterson White and National American Life Insurance Company agreed
that:
" ... in consideration of National American
Life Insurance Company of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, releasing unto appearor Stock Certificate No. 10, dated May 4, 1965, for ten
thousand (10 000) shares of the capital stock
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in First Security Savings and Loan Association, appearor does hereby pledge, assign and
hypothecate to National American Life Insurance Company, of Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
additional security for the above-referenced
deed of trust the following: pledge of stock
of American Public Life Insurance Company."
"Five. Appearor does hereby specifically
acknowledge and agree that the amount of principal due and owing to National American Life
Insurance Company under said deed of trust
is the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Forty and 16/100 ($59,740.16) Dollars
which said sum, plus interest, appearor does
specifically and unconditionally reaffirm, and
obligate herself to pay to National American
Life Insurance Company, of Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, all in accordance of the amortization schedule and the other stipulations and
provisions contained in said deed of trust."
(emphasis supplied)

In the depositions of Mr. Rufus D. Hayes and
Mr. Harold Webb, said witnesses verified that the
two pledge agreements, that of May 4, 1965 and
February 27, 1967, were acknowledged and accepted by the plaintiff, National American Life Insurance Company. National American did in fact act
upon and receive the respective securities under
the hypothecation agreements. Hayes and Webb
both testified that National American did not conbct East Lawn or consult with East Lawn concerning
the change in the security originally pledged. This
substitution was done without defendant's knowl-
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edge, consent or approval. Plaintiff's actions not
only damaged defendant, but was also a breach of
the duties owed by one in plaintiff's position.
As a general proposition, "a creditor owes one
who is a surety for a debt or undertaking the duty
of continuous good faith in dealing with the debt
or undertaking, or with security received to assure
the payment of the debt or the performan of the
undertaking. He is bound to a faithful observance
of the rights of the surety and to the performance
of every duty necessary for the protection of those
rights. The duty arises not from any contract of the
creditor with the surety, but from the equities of
the situation." 50 Am. Jur., Suretyship § 40. See also,
Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki, 447 P 2d 956, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 564 (1968).
The original security pledged in behalf of East
Lawn to insure payment of East Lawn's obligation
by White consisted of the controlling shares of First
Security Savings and Loan Association. 'vVhen White
agreed to purchase these shares, they were pledged
to National American as security for the payment
of the East Lawn obligation, which White agreed
to pay. The subsequent security consisting of a
minority stock interest in American Public Life Insuarnce Company, according to defendant's amended answer, was less valuable than the First Security Savings and Loan Shares. East Lawn was not
notified of the substitution. In Wallin v. Young, 180
P 2d 535, 181 Or. 185 (1947) the court indicated that
a surety will be discharged where a valid contract

15

is made between the creditor and the principal
debtor extends the time of payment, or where securities held by the creditor are voluntarly surrendered

without the consent of the surety, at least to the value of
such securities. (emphasis supplied). The acts of plaintiff

were sufficient in law to effect a release of defendant, at least to the value of the security released by
plaintiff, which value would necessarily be a factual
issue.
POINT 3.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT LEAVE TO
AMEND ITS PLEADINGS TO ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM AND 0 B T A I N AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
AGAINST PLAINTIFF.

In defendant's original answer, defendant asserted a Counterclaim seeking affirmative relief.
(R. 24). Defendant later amended his answer and
asserted an affirmative defense asserting matter
similar to those matters raised in the original Counterclaim. (R. 73). At the pre-trial hearing, the following exchange took place: (See Partial Transcript of
Pre-trial Proceedings pages 33 and 34.)
THE COURT: Do either of you have any objections to the pre-trial order?
MR. BALLIF:

I have none.

MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, we have in our
pleadings, and I apologize for my pleadings on this,
because-
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THE COURT: Don't make speeches. Do you
have any objection to the pre-trial order?
MR. TAYLOR: Only in that we have asked relief for damages, but those damages would be appliedTHE COURT:

What would the damages be?

MR. TAYLOR: The loss of the value of the corporation known as First Security Savings and Loan
Association.
THE COURT: On the present state of the
pleadings, if that figure should exceed the balance payable

on the note, I am not going to give you credit for it. I will
rule on it right now. You haven't asked for it and he objects.
There is no Counterclaim. (emphasis supplied)

MR. TAYLOR:
ative defense.

I had it in the form of an affirm-

THE COURT: You don't assert Counterclaims
as affirmative defenses.
This is on the record now. Let's be sure we
have the record.
The defendant-you wish to move to amend
your pleadings to assert a Counterclaim?

MR. TAYLOR: I would request permission

assert that Counterclaim.
THE COURT:

Do you object to it?

MR. BALLIF: Yes..

to
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THE COURT:

Objection sustained.

Rule 8-c, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads,
in part, as follows:
"When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a Counterclaim or a Counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." (emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the trial judge refused to
allow defendant leave to assert a Countercailm. This
refusal was contrary to the mandate of the abovequoted rule. Particularly in light of the fact that
there was nothing of record to indicate that the
plaintiff would be prejudiced by defendant's motion
at such a late date. In fact, defendant's original answer placed plaintiff on notice of defendant's assertion for affirmative relief. This assertion was apparently denominated an affirmative defense in the
amended answer. Although it is true that under Rule
15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must
obtain leave of Court to amend a pleading, it is also
true that: " ... levae shall be freely given when justice so
requires." (emphasis supplied) The effect of the trial
judge's ruling prevented defendant from asserting
a meritorious claim against plaintiff, which c,laim
would otherwise be extinguished. Such refusal by
the trial court constituted a sufficient abuse of discretion as to justify this court to return the matter for
trial on all of the issues, not merely those raised by
plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, appellant respectfully prays that this Court reverse the trial court's
decision appealed from in the following particulars:
1. By determining that there was sufficient
evidence of record to require the trial court to conclude as there was a novation as a matter of law.
2. Determining that the trial court erred in not
finding that relationship between plaintiff and defendant was one of suretyship from which defendant became discharged when plaintiff allowed the
substitution to take place.
3. Determining that the trial court's refusal to
allow defendant leave to amend to assert a Counterclaim was an abuse of descretion and unduly prejudiced defendant.
4. Setting aside the summary judgment of the
trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHMAN, PETERS & ADAMSON
Bill Thomas Peters
Attorneys for Appellant,
East Lawn Memorial Hills, Inc.
Suite 307 El Paso Natural Gas Building
315 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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